Distinction between expiry date and best before date

Madras High Court while dismissing a writ petition of Certiorari and Mandamus, observed that, there is a clear distinction between the term expiry date and the best before date, whereas, the best before date signifies the duration for which the product shall remain marketable and retain its specific qualities if stored in appropriate conditions and on the other hand, “expiry date” is the date on which the product shall completely cease to have the specific qualities associated with it and shall not remain marketable.

By virtue of Clause 1 of the Regulation 1.2 of the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011 Best before means the date which signifies the end of the period under any stated storage conditions during which the food shall remain fully marketable and shall retain any specific qualities for which tacit or express claims have been made and beyond that date, the food may still be perfectly safe to consume, though its quality may have diminished. However the food shall not be sold if at any stage the product becomes unsafe.

Further, by virtue of Clause 10 of the Regulation 1.2 of the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011 Use – by date” or “Recommended last consumption date” or Expiry date means the date which signifies the end of the estimated period under any stated storage conditions, after which the food probably will not have the quality and safety attributes normally expected by the consumers and the food shall not be sold.”

Court further noted that, petitioner cannot be allowed to mention a single date for both as it would mislead the consumers to think that the product will never lose its quality.

Read the full judgment of Amrut Distilleries Ltd. v. Authorised Officer, FSSAI (19-03-2015, Madras HC)

[Breaking] No domestic violence case can be filed against lover

While hearing a petition under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Justice S. B. SHUKRE of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court held that, under no circumstances, a lover is bound to pay maintenance to his lover who is a married women, because such relationship does not constitute a domestic relationship and therefore, the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be applied against the lover of the married woman.

The term domestic relationship is defined with referring to the apex courts view in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, ((2014 (1) ABR 615))where Supreme Court clarified the issue as to whether or not a concubine or a mistress, who is living together with a man for a considerably long period of time, would be entitled to derive benefits of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 by contending that she is in “domestic relationship” with that man.

Court further observed that, by virtue of Section 2 (f) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 it is clear that a woman, who is married, can’t enter into another domestic relationship. Court in this regard, further referred the judgement in Durgesh Yuvraj Rahangdale v. Rajni Krushnadatta Ukey, ((2014(1) ABR (Cri) 339))where it was held by the Supreme Court that, all live-in-relationships do not amount to relationships in the nature of marriage so as to get the benefit of the Act, 2005. It was further held by the apex court that, in order to take advantage of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, it is necessary for the petitioner as well as the accused to live in such a way that they are treated by the society at large as husband and wife and not only that they should also otherwise be qualified to enter into a legal marriage, with both of them being of legal age to marry, both of them being unmarried at the time when they enter into a relationship which is akin to a marriage and so on.

Read Full Judgment of Narayan Jangluji Thool v. Mala (decided on 27-01-2015, Bombay HC) Search for Criminal Writ Petition No: 773/2014 (Nagpur Bench)

[Breaking] Indians can marry foreigners under Special Marriage Act

Indian Parliament enacted the Special Marriage Act in the year 1954 providing an opportunity to all Indian nationals, including those who are resident of foreign countries to marry irrespective of their religious faith OR belief. In certain cases Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides a special form of marriage; provides registration of such marriages and also provides provisions for divorce.

In the give case between Devika Raj v. State of Kerala, came before the Honourable High Court of Kerala, decision of the Marriage Registration Officer prohibiting the petitioner from marrying a Canadian citizen under the provisions of Special Marriage Act, 1954 on the ground that, said Act does not apply in marrying a foreign national.

Hence, the question before the Honourable High Court was that, whether Indians can marry foreigners under Special Marriage Act? In this regard, court referred to earlier judgement in Rajeev v. State of Kerala ((2001 (1) KLT 578)), which relied on a decision of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Marian Eva v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((AIR 1993 Himachal Pradesh 7)), where the Court categorically found that the Special Marriage Act does not contain any prohibition for solemnisation of the marriage, if one of the parties is a foreigner.

In order to get a marriage registered under the provisions of Special Marriage Act, 1954 the parties shall comply with the provisions of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. In the given case, court observed that, the petitioner has duly complied said provisions.

High Court further interpreted the term “person” as mentioned in Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which does not indicate that either one of the parties or both the parties should be citizens of India.

In the light of above mentioned points, Honourable High Court allowed the petitioner to contract the marriage as she intended and instructed the Marriage Registration Officer to register their marriage under the provisions of Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Read Full Judgement of Devika Raj v. State of Kerala

[Breaking] No night shifts for women employees in Kerala after 10 PM

In order to ensure the safety of women employees, Honourable High Court of Kerala held that, women employees cannot be asked to work beyond 10 PM. While considering the petition filed by a woman employee of Seetharam Textiles, Kerala High Court observed that, now a days, crime rate against woman are increasing, and therefore it is essential to have sufficient precautionary measures to safeguard working woman.

In the present, case between CL Cicily v. Seetharam Textiles Ltd., the petitioner alleged that, compelling a women employee to work during night shifts are violating Section 66(1) (b) of the Factories Act, 1948. By virtue of Section 66(1) (b) of the Factories Act, 1948;

No woman shall be required or allowed to work in any factory except between the hours of 6 A.M. and 7 P.M.: Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, in respect of any factory or group or class or description of factories, vary the limits laid down in clause (b), but so that no such variation shall authorize the employment of any woman between the hours of 10 P.M. and 5 A.M.

Kerala High Court, while allowing the writ petition, directed the employer to strictly adhere with the provisions of Section 66(1)(b) of the Factories Act, 1948. Court further stated that, women employees can be employed only up to 10:00 PM, subject to the compliance of terms and conditions issued by the State Government of Kerala vide its Circular dated 07.06.2003. Said circular read as follows;

That, women can be employed till 10 P.M. provided that the employer must provide free transport facilities to the women; ensure the presence of minimum of five workers including two women in a shift; and that the spread over time to a worker in a day shall not exceed 9 hours including rest period.

Read full judgement of CL Cicily v. Seetharam Textiles Ltd.

[Breaking] Maximum age limit for appearing CLAT removed

While considering a Public Interest Litigation filed by the students of National Law School of India University, seeking to scrap the maximum age limit criteria for appearing the Common Law Admission Test, Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court, passed an interim order directing Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, to accept applications without any age discrimination.

In this regard, court further directed Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, to update their software system, where the applications are accepted online, so that, no applications will be rejected on the basis of maximum age limit.

While issuing the interim order, court observed that, the Bar Council of India, itself withdrawn the Clause 28 of Schedule III, Rule 11 of Bar Council of India Legal Education Rules, 2008 on the ground that, introduction of discriminatory classification of students by prescribing an age limit is in violation of the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961. Court, further considering the candidates from rural areas said that, fixing maximum age limit will not serve the purpose of conducting Common Law Admission Test.

Read Full Judgment of Kshitij Sharma v. Bar Council of India (04-03-2015, Rajasthan HC) OR Search for D.B. Writ (PIL) Petition No.2497/2015 at Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench

Earlier, in a similar case, Allahabad High Court also scraped the upper age limit for appearing CLAT Exam. Read more on No upper age limit for appearing CLAT exam, on the ground that, the same is in violation of Article 19 of Indian Constitution.

[Breaking] No upper age limit for appearing CLAT exam

While considering a writ petition seeking to issue a Writ of Certiorari, for quashing the advertisement notification issued by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, which seeks, seeks to prescribe the upper age limit of 20 years as an essential criterion for appearing in the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT Exam), held that, neither the provisions of State Universities or the National Law School of India Act, OR any other law whereby examination conducting universities have been empowered to fix upper age limit in the Common Law Entrance Examination.

Court further observed that, the statement of objects and reasons of National Law School of India Act, 1986 clearly lays down that one of the functions of the Bar Council of India is the promotion of legal education. Similarly, Object and Reasons of National Law School of India Act, 1986 states as follows;

One of the functions of the Bar Council of India is promotion of legal education. To carry out that object the Bar Council of India created a charitable trust called the Bar Council of India Trust, which in turn registered a Society known as the National Law School of India Society, in Karnataka. The Society framed necessary rules to manage the National Law School of India with powers to confer degrees, diplomas, etc., and requested the State Government to assist it, by establishing the School as a University by a statue so that it could carry out its objects effectively. The State Government considers it desirable to encourage the establishment of such a national level institution in the State.

Court further noted that, when other admission examinations for the courses like B.Ed, CA, SC, MBA etc. do not impose any upper age limit for appearing the common admission test, a restriction of the age to take admission violates the fundamental right as envisaged under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

While directing Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, to accept applications of the petitioners as well as other similar candidates, who are intending to appear the CLAT Exam, Court ruled that, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, is only an agency given with the responsibility to conduct the Common Law Admission Test, on behalf of respective National Law Universities, at par with the guidelines issued by the Bar Council of India.

Read Full Judgment of Devasheesh Pathak v. BCI, decided on 26-02-2015 (Allahabad High Court). Followed by theJaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court also removed the maximum age limit for appearing CLAT.